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IAN HOLLIDAY
Myanmar in 2012
Toward a Normal State
ABSTRACT
In 2012, Myanmar experienced another tumultuous year of reform. Executive,
legislative, and civic institutions advanced, but public administration and the judi-
ciary remained largely unchanged. While some ethnic relations improved, others
descended into bitter conflict. Economic and social development was patchy. Links
with the U.S. and its allies strengthened considerably.
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IN 2012, MYANMAR EXPERIENCED a tumultuous year of change as reforms
launched by President Thein Sein the previous year pressed ahead. In
January, leading political prisoners were released. In April, Aung San Suu
Kyi’s opposition party swept parliamentary by-elections, and Western states
responded by suspending economic sanctions and boosting aid. In August,
pre-publication press censorship was halted. In November, U.S. President
Barack Obama became the latest high-proﬁle visitor. Throughout the year,
Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi maintained regular contact, peace talks
were held with minority ethnic groups, and links with the outside world
multiplied.
At the same time, however, problems amassed during ﬁve decades of
military misrule proved resistant to rapid resolution. National reconciliation
with ethnic groups gained no purchase in Kachin State, and was severely
damaged by violence in Rakhine State. Economic development prompted
crony business leaders to make illegal land grabs but offered little to citizens
living in poverty. Relations with other Asian states were sometimes difﬁcult.
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By year-end, nobody really knew what might become the new normal in
Myanmar: discipline-ﬂourishing democracy focused on order and promoted
bymilitary leaders or liberal and federal democracy sought by opposition groups.
GOVERNANCE IN A TRANSITIONAL STATE
Behind the drama of major policy initiatives lay the sober reality of a state
primed to dispense violence and enrich cronies but ill-equipped to undertake
routine public administration. In 2012, governance reform thus became a key
issue, with rampant ofﬁcial corruption publicly targeted by Thein Sein.
In the executive, conservative Vice President Tin Aung Myint Oo resigned
in July and was replaced by political moderate and former navy chief Nyan
Tun. In late August, Thein Sein reshufﬂed his cabinet, moving or removing
nine ministers, selecting his ﬁrst female minister, and appointing 16 techno-
cratic deputy ministers. Hardliner Kyaw San moved from minister for infor-
mation (overseeing the media) to minister for cooperatives (overseeing very
little), and reformer Aung Kyi moved from minister of labor to take his place.
Although ministerial positions in the President’s Ofﬁce were boosted from
two to six, policy coordination remained messy. Tellingly, the top tier of
government still lacked leading ethnic minority ﬁgures.
In the legislature, placement of parliamentarians in executive positions in
2011 triggered by-elections in 48 constituencies in 2012, though ongoing
ﬁghting in Kachin State meant that only 45 seats were actually contested
on April 1. Campaigning dominated the early months of the year, and accu-
sations of malpractice were leveled by opposition candidates. In the event,
however, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, to
which all departing legislators belonged, retained only one upper-house seat;
the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party won another; and the opposition
National League for Democracy (NLD) took 43 seats (37 in the lower house,
four in the upper house, and two in provincial assemblies). Aung San Suu
Kyi, whose ﬁrst televised campaign speech was broadcast in March, was
elected to the lower house from the rural Kawhmu constituency south of
Yangon. A standoff over the oath of ofﬁce delayed the arrival of opposition
members of Parliament until the NLD climbed down. In September, Par-
liament ﬂexed its muscles by forcing the resignation of all nine constitutional
tribunal judges. Generally, political parties displayed limited discipline and
coherence in the legislature.
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Beyond the executive and legislative territory in the capital Nay Pyi Taw,
governance structures were harder to change. Although the 2010 general
election created decentralized assemblies in each of Myanmar’s seven regions
(mainly dominated by the majority Bamar ethnic group) and seven minority
ethnic states, they struggled in 2012 to ﬁnd their feet. The chief minister,
appointed by the president, and the military commander remained the most
important provincial ofﬁcials. At local levels, reform was often hampered by
unreconstructed political and administrative structures. Notwithstanding
NLD calls for change, the judiciary was largely untouched by reform.
It was thus all the more important that civic institutions advance. In the
media, pre-publication censorship imposed after the 1962 military coup was
gradually rolled back and, in a context of journalistic activism, was eliminated
on August 20. Although post-publication monitoring remained, Aung Kyi
did consult key stakeholders about a new media law. Overall, the media
environment improved, with exile groups opening Yangon ofﬁces and 200
weekly journals staking out ever greater political space, monitoring Parlia-
ment, and preparing to launch daily titles from April 1, 2013. On October 21,
2012, Thein Sein held his ﬁrst press conference for local journalists. In
December, the exile-run Irrawaddy magazine inaugurated distribution inside
the country. No journalist was jailed during the year.
In civil society, 651 leading political prisoners were released on January 13,
enabling the reconstituted 88 Generation Students, formed by individuals
who rose to prominence during the 1988 mass uprising for democracy, to
ﬁght for civic education and pro-poor policies. Smaller numbers of political
prisoners were released later in the year. In late August, a secret blacklist of
6,165 individuals was trimmed by 2,082 names (including some foreigners and
some dead persons). In September, the government in exile, formed by
members of the victorious NLD a few months after the abortive 1990 general
election, was dissolved. On a piecemeal basis, licenses were returned to
activist lawyers.
As 2012 progressed, there were many street demonstrations, notably
against electricity shortages in major cities in May and media restrictions
in Yangon in August. Land grabs in rural areas also provoked protests,
notably against Letpadaung copper mine in Monywa, Sagaing Region, a joint
venture between a military conglomerate and a Chinese company. Here,
a violent pre-dawn government clampdown on November 29 left 70–100
activists with severe injuries. Many were Buddhist monks. Solidarity protests
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in major cities persuaded the government quickly to appoint Aung San Suu
Kyi to head an investigative commission and, on December 15, to issue
a public apology for its repressive action.
ETHNIC ACCORD AND DISCORD
Standing somewhat apart from the main tranche of reform efforts was the
critical domain of ethnic relations. In the opening months of 2012, the
dominant theme was ethnic accord, symbolized above all by a January 12
ceaseﬁre agreement signed by the pivotal Karen National Union, its ﬁrst in
more than 60 years of civil conﬂict. In May, Thein Sein followed up by
forming and chairing an 11-member high-level peacemaking group, sup-
ported by a 52-member work committee. In June, the Myanmar Peace Centre
was formed with European funding. In the second half of the year, however,
ethnic discord became the decisive theme.
One ﬂashpoint was Kachin State, where a 17-year ceaseﬁre broke down on
June 9, 2011, triggering ﬁghting that lasted throughout 2012. Underlain by
economic grievances focused particularly on large-scale Chinese investments,
the conﬂict displaced tens of thousands of people internally and externally. In
August, 5,000 refugees in China returned home, allegedly of their own accord
following a lull in ﬁghting. In late December, the government acknowledged
using air strikes against Kachin rebels. Civil conﬂict also ﬂared in northern
Shan State. In zones of sporadic ﬁghting, it was not clear whether the national
army was fully under presidential control. In Karen State, a leadership split in
October threatened to unravel the fragile ceaseﬁre negotiated in January.
External engagement also became controversial when a Norwegian peace
initiative was criticized for insufﬁcient grassroots input.
Still more worrying was an eruption of ethnic violence in Rakhine State,
traced to a May 28 incident when a Rakhine Buddhist woman was reportedly
raped and killed by three Muslim men. On June 3, a large group of Rakhine
villagers stopped a bus and brutally killed 10 Muslim passengers. On June 8,
thousands of Rohingya Muslims rioted. On June 10, Thein Sein declared his
ﬁrst state of emergency as waves of violence killed at least 80, razed Rohingya
communities, displaced tens of thousands, and devastated inter-communal
relations. His ﬁrst substantive response, delivered to a senior U.N. ofﬁcial in
July, was that the 800,000Muslim Rohingya in Rakhine State posed a threat
to national security and should be held in refugee camps to await transport to
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third countries. This argument, trained on a minority group granted minimal
rights in Myanmar, was ampliﬁed by irate journalists, bloggers, and opposi-
tion leaders. Even Aung San Suu Kyi adopted at best evasive positions,
shifting from moral icon under house arrest to practical politician.
Subsequently, global outrage prompted an ofﬁcial rethink and, on August
17, Thein Sein created a broad-based 27-member investigative commission.
On October 21, however, violence returned to Rakhine State, and again at
least 80 were killed. The number of displaced persons, mostly Rohingya,
climbed to 110,000. Muslims were also targeted elsewhere. While Buddhist
monks led aggressive anti-Rohingya street protests, outsiders talked of
genocide.
By year-end, Myanmar’s ethnic issues had settled into three main cate-
gories. For most groups, ceaseﬁres, reconciliation, and political dialogue were
on the agenda, though no more than limited progress had been made. For the
Kachin, the possibility of a military solution could not be ruled out. For the
Rohingya, exclusion beyond the realm of national citizenship remained the
ofﬁcial position. Only rarely did hints of constructive action surface.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPERATIVES
As reform unfolded, an increasingly important preoccupation was delivering
tangible beneﬁts for ordinary people. Throughout the year, measures were
thus taken to boost business activity, tackle corruption in government
ministries, and enhance social progress.
In the economic sphere, a managed ﬂoat of the kyat, implemented on
April 1 at 818 to the U.S. dollar, eliminated multiple exchange rates ranging
from 6.4 (ofﬁcial) to sometimes more than 1,000 (black market). In parallel,
there was some reform of the banking system, and in big cities licensed
exchange bureaus and ATMs began to appear, though unofﬁcial trading
continued to ﬂourish. Plans were also announced to launch securities
exchanges in Yangon and Mandalay in 2015 with help chieﬂy from Tokyo.
Major investment projects unveiled in previous years and developed in
2012 included oil and gas pipelines built by China, the multimodal Kaledan
Gateway logistics project sponsored by India, and the Dawei deep-sea
port and special economic zone project, led by a Thai investor. The suspen-
sion of Western sanctions enabled many global corporations to take a look at
Myanmar, and some started to strike deals. General Electric, Pepsi, and
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Coca-Cola were to the fore. However, although a reasonably liberal foreign
direct investment law was ﬁnally passed in November, the regulatory envi-
ronment remained opaque and deﬁcient, and the infrastructure for business
was very poor. Extraction was still dominant, and China remained the lead
player with total investments of $14 billion, out of $40 billion accumulated
since 1988. Despite positive growth forecasts, huge economic challenges lie
ahead.
In the social sphere, a patchwork of reforms was implemented. Laws were
passed to boost labor and women’s rights, drawing in each case on stake-
holder input. Strikes became possible, and around Chinese New Year
a month-long dispute hit the Yangon footwear industry. Education was made
a priority, and the Yangon and Mandalay Institutes of Technology admitted
small cohorts of students following 24 years of closure. In November, an
NLD-sponsored motion to revive undergraduate studies at the University of
Yangon passed the lower house of Parliament. A pledge was made to elim-
inate forced labor by 2015, and the issue of child soldiers began to be tackled
not only in the national army but also in ethnic militias. In September, the
army took the symbolic step of publicly discharging 42 boys. On the streets of
Yangon, glitzy shopping malls began to open, and across the land billboards
advertising the ‘‘People’s Desire’’ and calls for military discipline were ﬁnally
removed. New Year’s Eve witnessed the ﬁrst ever public countdown in
Yangon, with some 90,000 people present.
However, positive change was still a distant prospect for many people.
Poverty remained endemic, consigning a quarter of the population to sub-
sistence. In major cities, prices were rising, crime was on the increase, and
gangs were taking to nighttime streets.
GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Ongoing political reform inside Myanmar generated a signiﬁcant reshaping
of ties with the outside world. Most dramatic was the normalization of
relations with the U.S., consummated by the July appointment of Derek
Mitchell as the ﬁrst full American ambassador in 22 years. In September, both
Aung San Suu Kyi and Thein Sein made successful American trips, and the
U.S. ﬁnally stopped vetoing the operation of international ﬁnancial institu-
tions in Myanmar. In October, an inaugural U.S.-Burma Human Rights
Dialogue was launched in Nay Pyi Taw, with military delegates present on
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both sides. Myanmar was also invited to send observers to the upcoming
Cobra Gold multinational military exercise led by the U.S. and Thailand.
On November 19, newly reelected President Obama became the ﬁrst
sitting U.S. president ever to visit. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton accom-
panied him. The six-hour trip embraced major politicians and civil society
leaders and heralded a deepening of American engagement through fresh aid
disbursements. Speaking with Thein Sein, Obama departed from U.S. policy
by referring to ‘‘Myanmar,’’ not ‘‘Burma.’’ At the University of Yangon, he
delivered a 30-minute speech, broadcast live on television, praising freedom
and extending the hand of friendship to proponents of inclusive political
reform.
Reengagement went wider and deeper than this, however, as all Western
states suspended economic sanctions, many countries boosted bilateral ties,
leading global agencies launched programs, several airlines resumed direct
ﬂights, and corporate executives and aid workers besieged Yangon. For the
ﬁrst time, annual visitor arrivals topped one million. On November 1, the
World Bank made its ﬁrst grant to Myanmar in 25 years, pledging $80million
from a planned $245 million assistance package. In turn, the Myanmar
government accredited international election observers; permitted external
monitoring of conﬂict zones, nuclear sites, and prisons; and sent senior
ministers on foreign visits. Enormous global interest focused on Aung San
Suu Kyi’s ﬁrst overseas trips since 1988 to Thailand in late April, Europe in
June, the U.S. in mid-September, and India in November. In Oslo on June
16, the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate delivered her acceptance speech. In
Washington on September 19, she received the Congressional Gold Medal.
Again, however, not all was positive. Thein Sein’s early handling of the
Rohingya issue sparked outrage in the Muslim world, and in August drew
a rebuke from 57 states assembled in the Organisation of Islamic Coopera-
tion. Saudi King Abdullah reportedly donated $50 million to relief efforts.
Relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which Myanmar
will chair in 2014, also became strained. U.S. Ambassador Mitchell noted that
deep-seated intolerance infecting even the opposition movement made
Myanmar a complex transitional case.
Last but not least, changing international relations had an impact on
Myanmar’s most important bilateral linkage with China (and also generated
a distancing from North Korea). In many ways, Myanmar’s outreach to the
U.S. and its allies was a necessary correction of dangerously skewed global
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ties. Nevertheless, China had reason to be concerned about its generally poor
public image in Myanmar, the continuing instability in Kachin State (which
borders both China and India), and energetic reengagement by the U.S. and
its Asian allies led by Japan. Thein Sein was thus careful to visit Beijing
immediately ahead of his September trip to New York.
CONCLUSION
Much changed in Myanmar in 2012, yet for ordinary people much remained
the same as reform impacts were conﬁned largely to elites. Although the
critical project of national reconciliation advanced on several fronts, it
suffered sharp and possibly decisive setbacks in Rakhine State, and faced
major challenges in Kachin State. While governance became more pluralistic
and social forces were unshackled, former general Thein Sein retained the
political initiative. By the end of 2012, Myanmar’s nascent democracy was
increasingly ﬂuid and even unstable. Discipline-ﬂourishing elements never-
theless remained prominent.
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